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On Tuesday, August 16, 2017, Roy Moore,1 seventy-year-old U.S. Senate-
hopeful and former (though perhaps ousted is more appropriate) Chief Justice of the 
Alabama Supreme Court, trotted to the polls atop his horse, a brown and white 
Tennessee walker named Sassy, to cast his vote in Alabama’s Senate Republican 
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 1. This Comment was written before the sexual misconduct allegations surfaced against 
Roy Moore, and before now-Senator Doug Jones defeated Moore in the December 2017 
Alabama special election. However, even before the sexual misconduct allegations arose, 
Moore was still grossly unfit to serve as a judge on the Alabama Supreme Court or in the U.S. 
Senate. Because this Comment addresses the subject of religion and the judiciary, I do not 
address the effect of those allegations on Moore as either a former judge or as a candidate for 
U.S. Senate.  
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primary.2 Clad in a black cowboy hat, black cowboy boots, blue jeans, and a fitted 
black t-shirt bearing the phrase “MILITARY POLICE,” Moore dismounted his horse 
and told the throng of reporters that he and his wife Kayla—also on horseback 
—“look[ed] forward to registering [their] vote to make this country great again.”3 
Moore continued, “I appreciate the people understanding that it’s not the money from 
Washington that will buy us this election, it’s the people of Alabama that are going 
to vote in this election.”4 Although Moore did not reach the majority support 
threshold that Tuesday, he did beat sitting U.S. Senator Luther Strange a little over a 
month later in the GOP Senate Runoff.5  
The crux of Moore’s ultimately failed Senate campaign was that “removing the 
sovereignty of a Christian God from the functions of government is an act of 
apostasy, an affront to the biblical savior as well as the Constitution.”6 Moore’s still-
accessible campaign website details his lifelong dedication to “acknowledg[ing] the 
sovereignty of God.”7 In fact, even his removals from office are couched in the 
unmistakable language of religious conviction—Moore was punished for his twin 
decisions to “acknowledge the sovereignty of God”8 and “uphold[] the sanctity of 
marriage as between one man and one woman.”9 But, as politicians often do, Moore 
misses the point.  
Moore was not removed twice from judicial office because he acknowledged the 
sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God; he was removed twice from office because 
he refused to set aside his subjective interpretation that the Judeo-Christian God is 
the moral foundation of the laws of the United States.10 With Moore serving, 
unfortunately, as the uniquely unlikeable mascot of those who would dare to bring 
religion into the judicial decision-making process, it is both easy and popular to argue 
that because judges are first and foremost public officers, they should be prohibited 
from invoking religious values in their decision-making. As a state actor, anything 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. Emily Tillett, Candidate Arrives to Polls on Horseback to Cast Alabama Primary 
Vote, CBS NEWS (Aug. 15, 2017, 1:44 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/candidate 
-arrives-to-polls-on-horseback-to-cast-alabama-primary-vote/ [https://perma.cc/P733-M58S].  
 3.  AL.com, Roy Moore Rides in to Vote, YOUTUBE (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=GzBrcCOTQQQ&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/DM8L-Q2PM]. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Eric Bradner, Roy Moore Wins Alabama Senate GOP Primary Runoff, CNN POLITICS 
(Sept. 27, 2017, 2:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/politics/alabama-senate-results 
-roy-moore-luther-strange/index.html [https://perma.cc/P733-M58S].  
 6. Michael Scherer, Roy Moore Disrupts U.S. Senate Race in Alabama – and Prepares 
for New Level of Defiance in Washington, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/politics/roy-moore-disrupts-alabama-senate-race--and-prepares-for 
-new-level-of-defiance-in-washington/2017/09/21/2a88a4a2-9e38-11e7-9083-fbfddf6804c2 
_story.html?utm_term=.1d74a993fb06 [https://perma.cc/PS93-FURS].  
 7. JUDGE ROY MOORE U.S. SENATE, https://www.roymoore.org/ [https://perma.cc/P9EF 
-BBYR]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
 10. See Shaun Marker, “It’s Time for Roy’s Rock to Roll” . . . After the Court of the 
Judiciary Speaks, Roy and His Rock, Roll, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
431, 442 (2005) (citation omitted).  
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that the judge does bears the stamp of the government. And the government, per the 
Constitution, must remain neutral when it comes to matters of religion.11 Of course, 
it is a problem when even a former judge such as Moore, several months after his 
suspension from judicial office for defying federal court orders concerning same-sex 
marriage,12 appears on a pastor’s radio show proclaiming that when God’s law 
conflict with man’s law, “God’s laws are always superior.”13 The problem grows 
ever larger when Moore, speaking at a luncheon hosted by Pro-Life Mississippi, 
declares that the First Amendment only protects the religious speech of Christians.14 
But Moore, despite his national prominence, is the exception when it comes to 
judicial officers who invoke religious values in judicial decision-making—not the 
norm. First, by all accounts, judges who are twice removed from office for failure to 
adhere to the U.S. Constitution rarely mount (at least initially) successful campaigns 
for legislative office. The idiosyncratic events that unfolded in Alabama in the fall 
of 2017 are not at all indicative of a rising trend across the fifty states.15 Second, 
Moore’s adversarial conception of the relationship between law and Christianity is 
not the only manner by which religion and law can interact. In fact, as this Comment 
argues, there is a strong argument in favor of acknowledging the role of religion in 
the judicial decision-making process, particularly where religion does not function 
as the foundation for the decision, but as one within a constellation of values that 
judges, who are already value-sensitive individuals,16 consider in order to arrive at a 
just opinion.  
While the saga of Moore’s refusal to put law above religion is perfect for the 
incisive soundbites that thrive in a twenty-four-hour news cycle, placing Moore at 
the epicenter of the conversation concerning religion and judicial decision-making 
displaces a far more constructive conversation. A conversation exploring the 
potential role or influence of religion on the judicial process itself.17 After all, what 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 12. Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Chief Justice, Suspended Over Gay 
Marriage Order, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/us/roy 
-moore-alabama-chief-justice.html [https://perma.cc/Y82M-JYBF].  
 13. Antonia Blumberg, Alabama Senate Front-Runner: Evolution Is Fake and 
Homosexuality Should Be Illegal, HUFF POST (Sept. 26, 2017), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/roy-moore-religion_us_59c2bd8be4b063b2531781a2 
[https://perma.cc/A7CD-4KS3]. 
 14. Mollie Reilly, Alabama Chief Justice Thinks the First Amendment Only Protects 
Christians, HUFF POST (May 5, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/05/alabama 
-judge-christians_n_5267662.html [https://perma.cc/M4RP-ZFDR]. 
 15. It is important to distinguish between Roy Moore’s popularity as an anti-
establishment candidate for U.S. Senate and Roy Moore’s removal from judicial office as the 
result of the findings of Alabama’s Judicial Inquiry Commission. Roy Moore’s popularity is 
likely due to a confluence of social and political factors that are beyond the scope of this 
Comment, yet his popularity is not an indicator of the waning efficacy of judicial inquiry 
commissions.  
 16. Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial Decision-Making, 81 
MARQ. L. REV. 513, 515 (1998).  
 17. This Comment does not adopt a specific definition of religion, but approaches religion 
in the same way that Scott C. Idleman does in The Concealment of Religious Values in Judicial 
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judges truly believe, and thus what informs their adjudicatory decision-making, is 
likely of deeper significance to rulings involving the most foundational aspects of 
human nature, including the rights to abortion and same-sex marriage, as well as the 
more mundane rulings involving jurisdictional, procedural, evidentiary, and remedial 
questions.18  
Before progressing any further, however, I would like to define what exactly this 
Comment means by “the acknowledgment of religious values in judicial decision-
making.” This definition borrows largely from a passage from Senior Judge Kermit 
V. Lipez’s19 discussion of religion as a type of formative life experience: “Whatever 
their life experiences might have been, judges cannot use them to disregard statutory 
commands, clear precedents and the probative force of evidence.”20 Yet many 
judicial decisions do not fall neatly into binary categories but are interstitial—filling 
in gaps where statutory or constitutional law is so general, or the common-law 
doctrine is so outmoded, that the judge must provide the law with content and context 
to decide specific cases.21  
Deciding such cases will inevitably lean on a process that combines logic, 
analysis, intuition, and common sense, all informed by the judge’s education, career, 
and cultural identity, which may very well include a religious identity.22 However, 
this Comment departs from Judge Lipez’s suggestion that transparency—judges 
explicitly acknowledging the role of religion within the text of their decisions 
—might be beneficial in certain contexts.23 Rather, this Comment posits that the 
Code of Conduct for United States Judges (“Code of Conduct”)24 and the American 
Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”)25 should 
explicitly acknowledge the role of extralegal values in judicial decision-making to 
provide judges with guidance on the appropriate scope of the role of religion as a 
legitimate external influence. Judge Lipez’s ideal of total transparency is attractive, 
but the cost of such transparency would result in a steady stream of appeals—not to 
mention the recusal and disqualification motions that would plague those judges who 
                                                                                                                 
 
Decisionmaking: “the designation of a system or belief as ‘religious’ may stem largely from 
the nature of the questions it addresses and the role of the answers to those questions in the 
life of one who adheres to the system or belief.” 91 VA. L. REV. 515, 517 n.9 (2005) 
[hereinafter Concealment]. Idleman’s approach to religion is most useful because it does not 
rely on membership to an institutionalized form of religion but embraces the presence of 
nontraditional spiritual values in an individual’s life that provide a kind of “religious” 
guidance.  
 18. See id. at 517.  
 19. Judge Lipez is a senior judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Kermit V. Lipez, 
U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FIRST CIR., http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/kermit-v-lipez [https://perma 
.cc/X49Q-WG9L]. 
 20. Kermit V. Lipez, Is There a Place for Religion in Judicial Decision-Making?, 31 ME. 
B.J. 16, 20 (2016). 
 21. Id. at 17. 
 22. See id. at 20.  
 23. Judge Lipez argues that transparency might be beneficial in the context of the 
sentencing process, where a judge’s religious background might manifest itself in the form of 
judicial mercy, which undoubtedly serves a legitimate purpose in that setting. Id. at 21.  
 24. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 2014). 
 25. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
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dare to author decisions averring religious influence. Consequently, this Comment 
advocates for limited amendments to the abovementioned codes to initiate 
transformation in public perception of the role that extralegal values such as religion 
arguably already play in judicial decision-making.  
This Comment advocates for the acknowledgment of religious values in judicial 
decision-making in three parts. Part I explores the role of religion in American 
politics, and more specifically, the role of religion in federal judicial confirmation 
hearings and state-level judicial elections. Membership to an institutionalized 
religion often performs an essential gatekeeping function when it comes to assessing 
the background or personal values of a candidate for political or judicial office. The 
initially positive role of religion in judicial selection processes suggests that the 
practice of refusing to acknowledge the role that religion likely already plays in 
judicial decision-making is wholly cosmetic. This skin-deep predilection only leads 
to the concealment of religious values in judicial decision-making, and such 
concealment benefits neither judge nor litigant.  
Part II considers arguments for and against acknowledging the role of religion in 
judicial decision-making. Specifically, Part II looks to arguments proffered by Judge 
Lipez, Judge Wendell L. Griffen, Scott C. Idleman, and the late Judge Marion 
Callister in Idaho v. Freeman in favor of acknowledgment, and former New Mexico 
Supreme Court Justice Gene E. Franchini, Bruce A. Green, and Derek H. Davis in 
favor of maintaining the faux secular status quo. Part III recommends changes to 
Rule 2.4 of the Model Code, as well as Canons 3(A)(1) and 3(C)(1) of the Code of 
Conduct. I propose adding language to the Comment to Rule 2.4, which governs 
external influences on judicial conduct,26 to distinguish between appropriate 
consultation with extralegal sources and inappropriate supplanting of the law with 
extralegal sources. I propose entirely new commentary for Canon 3(A)(1), which 
governs a federal judge’s performance of her adjudicative responsibilities,27 and 
Canon 3(C)(1), which governs disqualification,28 respectively, to reiterate two ideas 
highlighted in this Comment. First, faithfulness to the law does not preclude 
consultation with extralegal sources; and second, determinations of judicial 
impartiality are based on the “disinterested observer” standard29—not the 
perceptions of the parties appearing before a judge.  
I. INSTITUTIONALIZED RELIGION AS THE GATEKEEPER TO THE JUDICIARY 
At a recent hearing for Amy Coney Barrett of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, formerly a law professor at Notre Dame, Democratic Senator Diane 
Feinstein expressed grave doubts that now-Judge Barrett would uphold Roe v. 
Wade30 due to her traditional Catholic beliefs.31 During that same hearing, another 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Id. at r. 2.4. 
 27. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3(A)(1) (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 2014). 
 28. Id. at Canon 3(C)(1).  
 29. Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 727 (D. Idaho 1981).  
 30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 31. Emma Green, Should a Judge’s Nomination Be Derailed by Her Faith?, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/catholics-senate-amy 
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Democrat, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, was visibly irritated that now-Judge Barrett 
and her fellow nominee, then-sitting Michigan Supreme Court Justice Joan Larsen 
(now-Judge Larsen of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit), were 
respectively unwilling to discuss the intersection between their personal beliefs and 
their legal decision-making processes. Senator Whitehouse lamented, “[t]o sit here 
and pretend that there is no role for people’s personal and private views . . . when 
they go to the court—it’s just, it’s so preposterous as to be silly.”32  
Senator Whitehouse is correct—such pretensions are preposterous and silly. The 
very fact that Senate hearings on federal judicial nominees even address religion 
suggests dual realities: that senators recognize there is a high probability that 
personal values do permeate judicial decision-making, and that membership to 
normative, institutionalized Judeo-Christian religions frequently serves a 
gatekeeping function, demonstrating that the would-be judge passes the baseline 
“trustworthiness” test. If then-Professor Barrett or then-Justice Larsen were, say, 
card-carrying members of the Order of Bards, Ovates, and Druids, Senators Feinstein 
and Whitehouse would be expressing their misgivings about other nominees.  
Elected judges, too, are implicitly—though perhaps depending on the region, 
explicitly—required to subscribe to a normative, institutionalized Judeo-Christian 
religion. According to Wendell Griffen, an Arkansas appellate judge and Baptist 
minister, “[i]n many instances the candidates for judicial office include their religious 
affiliation in their campaign materials.”33 The inclusion of such personal information 
in campaign materials reveals that not only is the electorate interested in learning 
such information about their elected officials, but candidates for judicial office 
perceive a value in revealing such otherwise private information. That religion plays 
a meaningful role in the lives of millions of people all over the world is hardly a 
revolutionary statement. One of the reasons that an electorate might be eager to learn 
about the religious affiliations of candidates for judicial office—and one of the 
reasons that candidates are generally quite willing to share such information—is so 
the electorate can use that knowledge to forge an immediate connection with the 
candidate. I don’t know you and you don’t know me, but we both worship the same 
(or at least a) God, and that means I can relate to you on a human level. 
To illustrate this point, I offer two lines of reasoning. First, atheists are often 
treated as aberrant. For example, in 2007, only forty-five percent of Americans said 
they would vote for a qualified atheist presidential candidate.34 A study from the 
University of British Columbia found that the reason atheists are so disliked boils 
down to trust.35 The study revealed that people distrust atheists due to the belief that 
people behave better when they think that God is watching over them, and such self-
                                                                                                                 
 
-barrett/539124/ [https://perma.cc/3JAN-K92P].  
 32. Id.  
 33. Griffen, supra note 16, at 516. 
 34. Jeffrey M. Jones, Some Americans Reluctant to Vote for Mormon, 72-Year-Old 
Presidential Candidates, GALLUP (Feb. 20, 2007), http://news.gallup.com/poll/26611/some 
-americans-reluctant-vote-mormon-72yearold-presidential-candidates.aspx [https://perma.cc 
/QX28-GVN9].  
 35. Daisy Grewal, In Atheists We Distrust, SCI. AM. (Jan. 17, 2012), https://www 
.scientificamerican.com/article/in-atheists-we-distrust/ [https://perma.cc/C8DL-CQVN]. 
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consciousness spurs them to comport themselves in more socially acceptable ways.36 
Second, when people are at their most vulnerable, religion can serve as a powerful 
source of guidance and comfort. In the week following the terror attacks on 
September 11, 2001, research published in The New England Journal of Medicine 
found that sixty percent of Americans attended a religious or memorial service and 
Bible sales rose twenty-seven percent.37 It makes sense, then, that candidates for 
judicial office, whether by appointment or election, must claim some religious 
affiliation if they hope to be successful.  
The remainder of Part I turns back to a point made in the first paragraph of this 
Part, that senators themselves, evidenced by their aggressive questioning of a 
candidates’ religious beliefs, acknowledge that personal values can and do play a role 
in the judicial decision-making process. On the elective side, the prevalence of 
religion in judicial campaigns solidifies the same point. Let’s begin with the latter. 
In recent years, emboldened by the rush of big money into judicial elections,38 
judicial campaigns have become “nastier, noisier, and costlier.”39 Campaigns have 
become costlier, in part, because there are so many effective mediums through which 
to reach the electorate. One such medium is television. Anthony Champagne 
highlights the key themes that judicial candidates seek to impart to prospective 
voters.40 Champagne isolates three unsurprising themes: crime control, civil justice, 
and family values.41 Within the theme of family values, Champagne finds that 
demonstrable religious convictions operate as valuable proxies: one Mississippi 
candidate highlighted his role as a Baptist deacon when describing his involvement 
with a child protection program.42 An Alabama candidate connected his position as 
a deacon to his thirty-year marriage.43 
 On the appointive side, before revisiting the discussion of the Senate hearings 
concerning Judge Barrett and Judge Larsen, let’s take a quick detour into the Senate 
confirmation hearings of yore. The date is September 14, 2005, and it is the third day 
of then-Judge John Roberts’s (of the Court of Appeals for District of Columbia 
Circuit) Senate confirmation hearings concerning his nomination to the Supreme 
Court.44 Senator Feinstein, musing about the “role Catholicism would play” in his 
decisions if appointed to the Supreme Court, asks then-Judge Roberts to reaffirm 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Harold G. Koenig, Research on Religion, Spirituality, and Mental Health: A Review, 
54 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 283, 285 (2009).  
 38. Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 669, 
670 (2002).  
 39. Id. (citing Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 
61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (1998)). 
 40. See id. at 675–81. 
 41. Id. at 674–79.  
 42. Id. at 680.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/C8DL-CQVN]. 
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President John F. Kennedy’s statement that the “separation of church and state is 
absolute.”45 Then-Judge Roberts declines to do so.46 “I don’t know what you mean 
by absolute separation of church and state,” he opines, “I do know this, that my faith 
and my religious beliefs do not play a role in judging.”47 Senator Feinstein has no 
follow-up questions on the topic.48  
Perhaps Senator Feinstein was satisfied with now-Chief Justice Roberts’s answer 
to her question; or, perhaps she just sensed that she was never going to get the answer 
that she wanted, a simple “yes, Senator.” But what is striking about this exchange, 
and what perhaps never quite gets teased out in the highly polarizing debates 
surrounding religion and the judiciary, is that when Senator Feinstein contemplates 
the role of Catholicism in then-Judge Roberts’s decision-making process, she is not 
actually asking whether the separation between church and state is absolute. 
Catholicism, of course, can play a role in one’s decision-making processes even 
while said decision-maker is “absolutely” capable of separating church and state. 
And yet she conflates the two questions during her exchange with then-Judge 
Roberts. 
Fast forward twelve years later to September 2017: Senator Whitehouse captures 
Senator Feinstein’s enduring logical fallacy in his frustration with then-Professor 
Barrett and then-Justice Larsen.49 According to Senator Whitehouse, to operate under 
the pretense that personal values play no role on the bench is laughable.50 Yet if either 
nominee had been so bold as to honestly discuss the interplay between religion and 
judicial decision-making, they would have shattered the legal blogosphere. While 
senators, legislators, and citizens are aching for real insight into the kinds of 
considerations, life experiences, and values that go into the judicial decision-making 
process, the actual confirmation process offers no such insight. The increasingly 
hostile environment surrounding judicial—particularly Supreme Court and federal 
appellate court—appointments indicates that legislators and non-legislators alike 
realize that a potential judge or justice’s religious background can often be just as 
important as their scholarly or professional training.51 But this begs the question: why 
are Americans so hell-bent on acting against their own intuition?  
The federal appointive process is uniquely unsatisfying in that it can elevate a 
nominee’s religious background to a major point of contention, but then fails to ever 
provide a mechanism by which that religious background can serve as anything other 
than a liability. And maybe that nominee’s religious background will be a liability; 
maybe her background will prevent her from fair and impartial application of the 
law. But if that is the case, then the appointment process is the place to exclude such 
bad actors. If religion comes up on a regular basis in these hearings—and in judicial 
election campaigns for that matter—then surely it is because religion maintains 
enduring value in American sociocultural reality.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Id. at 227. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Green, supra note 31. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Mark C. Modak-Truran, Reenchanting the Law: The Religious Dimension of Judicial 
Decision Making, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 709, 713 (2004). 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE SURROUNDING THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN 
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
A. Against the Role of Religion in Judicial Decision-Making  
Before delving into the arguments in favor of and against acknowledging the role 
of religion in judicial decision-making, it is important to take stock of the rules that 
those who write against the role of religion in judicial decision-making often cite in 
their favor. Outside of codes of conduct aimed squarely at regulating judicial actors, 
critics often cite the Establishment Clause,52 the Free Exercise Clause,53 and the Due 
Process Clause.54 This Comment does not address these perceived limitations on the 
presence of religious values in judicial decision-making because they are enshrined 
in the Constitution, and the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments are unlikely to 
budge in their respective language. Furthermore, cases concerning judicial 
disqualification motions rarely reference constitutional limitations on religion in 
judicial decision-making, but generally articulate alleged violations in the language 
of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”), the Code of Conduct 
for United States Judges, or 28 U.S.C. § 455, the federal statute regulating the 
disqualification of federal judges.55 Consequently, this Part focuses on the use of 
rules within these two codes to set up a discussion of the arguments against the role 
of religion in judicial decision-making.56 
Rule 2.4 of the Model Code governs external influences on judicial conduct.57 
Section (B) states that a “judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or 
other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or 
judgment.”58 Religion does not receive a special shout out in Rule 2.4, but likely falls 
under “social” or “other” interests. Canon 2(A) of the Code of Conduct asserts that a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”). 
 53. Id. (The First Amendment continues, “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).  
 54. Id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). Scholars have questioned “whether 
decisionmaking grounded in religious values or authority can be said to exhibit a rational basis 
or a legitimate government purpose,” and whether the role of religion in judicial decision-
making raises notice issues, as the parties may not have knowledge of the values on which the 
judge is basing her decision. Scott C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 537, 556, 558–59 (1998) [hereinafter Limits].  
 55.  28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). 
 56. Part III ultimately proposes revisions to both codes to permit acknowledgment of the 
role of religion in judicial decision-making. Part II discusses § 455 at length.  
 57. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). Canon 2(B) of the 
Code of Conduct for United States Judges imparts a similar point: “A judge should not allow 
family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or 
judgment.” CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2(B) (JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE 2014). 
 58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.4(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).  
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“judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner 
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”59 
Canon 2 addresses impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, and the 
supplanting of legal precedent with religious text or values à la Roy Moore is a 
perfect example of Canon 2 impropriety sprung to life.  
Finally, the regulations within Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct require “fair[], 
impartial[] and diligent[]” performance of judicial duties.60 Canon 3 addresses, 
among other concerns, a judge’s adjudicative responsibilities, in addition to grounds 
for judicial disqualification.61 Religion, while not expressly invoked in the judge’s 
adjudicative responsibilities, is implied in the “partisan interests” portion of Canon 
3(A)(1): “A judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional competence in, 
the law and should not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of 
criticism.”62 Religion is similarly implicitly referenced in Canon 3(C)(1), which 
requires that the judge disqualify herself in a proceeding in which her impartiality 
might be questioned.63 Because Canon 3(C) can trigger disqualification not only 
where the judge is acting in an identifiably partial manner, but where the judge’s 
impartiality is in question at all, the combination of Canon 3(C) and an outwardly 
religious judge can result in calls for recusal or disqualification.  
Both codes clearly have an interest in preserving an impartial judiciary that, to the 
public eye, operates perfectly free of external influences—whether those influences 
be social, personal, political, or financial. When it comes to the external influence 
prong of Rule 2.4, critics are generally accepting of the fact that external influences 
do exist, and will subconsciously, from time-to-time, if not all the time, enter the 
judge’s mind.64 And yet, according to scholars such as Bruce A. Green, “it does not 
follow that the judge may consciously draw on these beliefs in making judicial 
determinations.”65 To the extent they enter the judge’s mind, posits Green, “he would 
be expected to put them to the side and make the decision based exclusively on 
considerations that the law prescribes.”66 Green’s distinction between the 
subconscious and the conscious when it comes to judicial decision-making is 
problematic: if a judge is by definition unaware of the influences or experiences at 
work in her subconscious, then how is she to consciously set those influences or 
experiences aside? Green’s theory supposes that every judge has a convenient on and 
off switch that controls her conscious, so that when necessary, she can slip into her 
personalized philosophical vacuum.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2(A) (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
2014).  
 60. Id. at Canon 3.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at Canon 3(A)(1).  
 63. Id. at Canon 3(C)(1).  
 64. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional 
Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 34–35 (1997) (“[A] judge’s personal moral and 
religious beliefs are part of what the judge invariably brings to the decisionmaking process . . 
. and the judge may be influenced by them subconsciously.”). 
 65. Id. at 34.  
 66. Id. at 34–35. 
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Former New Mexico Supreme Court Justice Gene E. Franchini echoes Green 
when he narrates a tale from his time as a New Mexico trial judge.67 Rather than 
adhere to the state’s stringent mandatory sentencing law for certain crimes 
committed while using a gun when he believed doing so would result in grave 
injustice to the first-time offender standing before him, then-Judge Franchini 
resigned.68 He resigned, in his own words, because he did not want “to impose on 
any other person—judicial officer or not—[his] personal beliefs of what justice is, or 
[his] ideas as to its administration.”69 Franchini certainly made the correct decision—
if one cannot follow the law as clearly stated then resignation, recusal, or 
disqualification are all solid options.  
However, what Franchini gets wrong is his equation of his personal moral 
dilemma with the average judge trying to apply the law free of any “personal, 
religious, or philosophical beliefs.”70 Franchini, perhaps going even one step further 
than Green, claims that if a judge cannot “set aside any and all of these factors in the 
decisionmaking process[,] . . . resignation may be the only remaining option.”71 
Franchini did not have a problem with “setting aside” his personal values; he had a 
problem because he literally wanted to set aside the law to come to a conclusion 
unsupported by clear-cut sentencing guidelines. Most judges who engage in a value-
sensitive decision-making process do not elevate external influences—their personal 
beliefs, values, and experiences—above the law; rather, they use their individual 
backgrounds as one of many lenses through which the law can be understood.  
Not unlike Rule 2.4, which warns against external influences, Canon 3(A)(1) 
states that a judge should maintain professional competence in the law and not be 
swayed by partisan interests.72 Professional competence in the law is required, among 
other reasons, to promote stability and predictability for those appearing before a 
judge.73 If judges are free to use their religious beliefs in their legal decision-making, 
how will litigants and lawyers be able to predict or prepare for the outcome of their 
cases?74 Furthermore, the judiciary only represents a limited slice of the multitude of 
religions practiced in the United States. Allowing judges to use or consult religious 
teachings in their decision-making would invariably result in the advancement and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. See Gene E. Franchini, Conscience, Judging, and Conscientious Judging, 2 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 19 (2000).  
 68. Id. at 19–21.  
 69. Id. at 21.  
 70. Id. at 25.  
 71. Id. 
 72. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(A)(1) (JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE 2014). 
 73. Margot G. Benedict, Note, Curbing Religion’s Influence on the Judiciary, 29 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 793, 798 (2016) (“Allowing religion into decisionmaking would create an 
unpredictable atmosphere surrounding the courts and would undermine what people think of 
as the law.”).  
 74. See, e.g., id.; see also Kent Greenawalt, Religious Expression in the Public Square 
—The Building Blocks for an Intermediate Position, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1411, 1419 (1996) 
(“[O]ne expects judges to rely on arguments they believe should have force for all judges.”).  
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enforcement of a select few religions’ ideals in the American legal system.75 
According to Derek H. Davis, alongside this interest in democratic stability, our 
political system separates church and state because any government endorsement of 
religion “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders . . . and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community.”76 Such a message, that “adherents . . . are favored members of 
the political community,” would then undoubtedly implicate Canon 3(C)(1), 
requiring recusal or disqualification every time there might be perceived religious 
asymmetry between party and judge.  
But again, such critiques of the dangers of religion in judicial decision-making 
fail to distinguish between using religious values as one of many values that the judge 
can account for in arriving at a decision, and using religion as the sole value in 
arriving at a decision. The latter is tantamount to government-endorsed religion. The 
former is not. Professional competence in the law does not require a judge to act as 
though the law exists in a vacuum. Law does not exist in a vacuum, just as those who 
are tasked with applying it do not. In the United States, citizens and noncitizens of 
all faiths have access to a predominantly Judeo-Christian federal and state judiciary. 
Religious asymmetry between party and judge is not grounds for disqualification; 
religious asymmetry is a reality of the American judicial process. Additionally, 
concerns of stability and predictability are overblown. Well-trained lawyers do all 
kinds of background research involving judges before whom the lawyers plan to 
appear. Such research is not an affront to the norms of democracy—it is simply good 
lawyering.  
B. In Favor of the Role of Religion in Judicial Decision-Making 
Section B argues three overarching points. The first and second points are 
interrelated: first, religion parallels secular values that are already acknowledged in 
judicial decision-making, such as history or economic theory; second, there is an 
important, but oft overlooked intersection between religious teaching and intellectual 
traditions. That religion can offer such intellectual merit reinforces the notion that 
religious values can be as edifying and serviceable as their secular counterparts. 
Third, this Section contends that despite the limitations on judges’ out-of-court 
religious activities, these limitations are not nearly as pervasive as one might think. 
State judges are rarely disciplined for their participation in religious activities, and 
even federal judges are rarely subject to disqualification under § 455 for their 
religious affiliations.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. Greenawalt, supra note 74, at 1418–19. 
 76. Derek H. Davis, Religion and the Abuse of Judicial Power, 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 203, 
208 (1997) (citation omitted).  
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1. Parallels Between Religious Values and Secular Values  
Judge Lipez believes that “religion . . . plays an unacknowledged part in judicial 
decision-making,”77 and “rather than pretending otherwise, [society] should 
acknowledge that fact and explore its implications.”78 The majority of judges 
(perhaps, at the risk of generalizing, like most Americans) are raised within some 
religion tradition, and thus it is not feasible to expect that they will shun without 
qualification that particular aspect of their identity each time they take the black.79 
Those who oppose engagement with religious values in the judicial decision-making 
process often cite the fact that the judiciary, in large part, fails to mirror the religious 
diversity of the citizenry.80 However, all judges do not share a communal knowledge 
or understanding of history, economics, mathematics, science, literature, the arts, or 
even cultural and social norms.81 Society does not demand absolute homogeneity of 
thought or action from its judges—and rightfully so. Just as judges are not expected 
to disavow their economic, political, philosophical, psychological, historical, or 
scientific backgrounds at the door when deciding a case, judges should not be 
expected to disavow their religious backgrounds.82  
Judge Griffen echoes the perspective of Judge Lipez. 
[If] economic values, social values, values about political ideology and 
the function of government in human society, and values about risks and 
benefits can be analyzed and included in the jurisprudential way judges 
decide cases and controversies, religious values can also be analyzed and 
included jurisprudentially.83 
Religious values can very much be the object(s) of jurisprudential analysis. That 
religious voices are different from those voices grounded in secular traditions does 
not make them less articulable, less reliable, or even less susceptible to vigorous 
debate and open criticism.84 In fact, as Judge Griffen argues, perhaps the most 
effective means by which to regulate the use of religious values in judicial decision-
making is to condone their entry into the judicial marketplace of ideas—to allow 
religious values to be “examined, challenged, debated, and defended as more or less 
helpful means of reaching just decisions.”85 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. Lipez, supra note 20, at 17. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 73, at 798–99. 
 81. Griffen, supra note 16, at 518. 
 82. Id.; see also Idleman, Concealment, supra note 17, at 521 (“In particular, whether 
from the standpoint of psychology, theology, or philosophy, it is generally accepted that the 
religious or religiously-influenced aspects of one’s perspectives or thought processes cannot 
simply be set aside or excluded, like some form of non-admitted evidence, at least for purposes 
of addressing or resolving matters of any significance.”).  
 83. Griffen, supra note 16, at 516. 
 84. Id. at 519.  
 85. Id. 
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2. The Intellectual Value of Religious Teachings and Traditions  
Alongside the notion that religion functions as one of many values that the value-
sensitive judge might consider in her decision-making process, it bears mentioning 
that religious teachings and values are not unlike their secular counterparts (i.e., 
philosophy, history, arts, literature) in that religion is not merely a source of “private 
comfort or irrational insight.”86 Scott C. Idleman highlights the intrinsic intellectual 
value of religious traditions: “Many of the religious traditions in this country are, 
after all, repositories for centuries of deep reflection upon human nature, society, and 
ethics—in short, upon the human condition.”87 In that vein, even the nonreligious 
judge may not be able to avoid reliance on religious values, because questions 
involving religion and morality are so deeply intertwined.88 And even where one can 
identify “deep moral premises” without consultation with religious sources, the 
religious sources are “undoubtedly of causal significance.”89 Religious values, while 
not universal across all faiths, certainly have significant overlap when it comes to 
basic themes surrounding human nature and justice. 
At the margins of judicial philosophy, consultation with religious sources can be 
humbling and edifying for the well-meaning judge. Religion is akin to a subset of 
ideology; but religion, unlike secular ideology, is emboldened by the moral force of 
faith in the divine. Because of the moral force that often attaches itself to religious 
ideology, religion is approached not as a positive, rational force, but as a perilous, 
irrational path down which the likes of Roy Moore would have the judiciary go. Yet 
it is unfair to disqualify religion as an intellectually feeble enterprise because isolated 
bad actors like Roy Moore think that the rule of law is inferior to their subjective 
interpretation of Christianity, or because well-meaning judges such as Gene 
Franchini conflate an unwillingness to consider other values beyond their individual 
notions of justice with an unwillingness to recognize the law as is.90  
Idleman’s basic premise, that religious traditions in the United States are 
repositories for centuries of profound reflection on the human condition, counters the 
Moores and Franchinis of the judiciary. There is intellectual weight behind the moral 
force associated with religious ideology—but the judge making use of religious 
ideology must be willing and capable to engage with its intellectual aspects. It is 
worth mentioning that religious and secular values do not come into play in every 
decision. Such values are most useful, as the previous paragraph begins, at the 
margins of judicial philosophy. In those cases that do not fall into binary categories 
and require the judge to provide the law with content and context, religion should be 
treated as another source of ideology or secular value that a judge looks to for 
nonbinding guidance.91 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. Teresa S. Collett, “The Kings Good Servant, But God’s First”: The Role of Religion 
in Judicial Decisionmaking, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1296 (2000).  
 87. Idleman, Limits, supra note 54, at 550.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Kent Greenawalt, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 147 (1995). 
 90. See supra text accompanying notes 67–71 (discussing Franchini’s decision to resign). 
 91. Thanks to Professor Charles G. Geyh for helping to flesh out this point.  
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3. The Myth of the Secular Judge  
The final reason that the role of religion should be acknowledged in judicial 
decision-making is that judges frequently engage in religious activities outside their 
chambers. Even in hot button disqualification cases where the religious affiliations 
of judges are under the microscope, the outcome tends to favor the judge. This 
Section discusses a federal disqualification case, Idaho v. Freeman,92 to illustrate the 
difficulty that litigants face when attempting to force recusal or disqualification for 
reasons related to religious affiliation. First, however, this Section briefly highlights 
a similar phenomenon in the state-court system, where judges may serve in positions 
within their churches and religious communities.  
Numerous state judicial ethics advisory committee opinions appreciate—as 
opposed to punish—the role that judges can perform as “community leaders through 
religious organizations, and understand the desire of judges to serve their religious 
communities as volunteers.”93 The Arizona Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee 
permitted a judge to “play a prominent role in a religious ceremony or service.”94 
The Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee permitted a judge to serve as a vestryman 
(or church council member) for his church.95 The Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981). In addition to Freeman, there are numerous 
significant cases from the lower federal courts that address the issue of religion and 
disqualification. See, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 
659–60 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding no abuse of discretion in district judge’s refusal to recuse 
himself from the case because of his membership in the Episcopal church, reiterating that 
“facts pleaded will not suffice to show the personal bias required by the statute if they go to 
the background and associations of the judge rather than to his appraisal of a party personally” 
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 388 F. Supp. 155, 
159 (E.D. Pa. 1974)); Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1984) (denying 
defendant’s motion to recuse Mormon judge on grounds that lawsuit involved, inter alia, the 
“theocratic power structure of Utah”); United States v. Odeh, No. 13-cr-20772, 2014 WL 
3767808, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2014) (denying defendant’s motion to recuse district judge 
based on judge’s fundraising efforts on behalf of the Detroit Jewish Federation, a social service 
organization which distributes some of its funds to provide social services in Israel and other 
international Jewish communities); United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (a district judge declined to recuse himself from deciding a charge of 
conspiracy in connection with the World Trade Center bombings in the face of claims that his 
Jewish faith and alleged ties to Zionism rendered him incapable of serving as an impartial 
judge); Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 527 F. Supp. 632, 634–35 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (a district 
judge refused to recuse himself in a case seeking to prevent Jewish youth from wearing 
yarmulkes while participating in interscholastic sports, despite his prior involvement with the 
American Jewish Congress).  
 93. Daniel R. Suhr, The Religious Liberty of Judges, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 179, 
189 (2011).  
 94. Id. at 189 n.63 (citing Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-01 (1993), 
https://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/ethics_opinions/1993/93-01.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/D2FK-H73L]).  
 95. Id. (citing Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1980-10 (1980), https://www.courts.state 
.md.us/sites/default/files/import/ethics/pdfs/1980-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4CD-WCD8]).  
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Panel permitted a judge to serve as the president of the board of directors of a private 
Christian high school.96 To be fair, state ethics boards and panels place defined limits 
on the religious liberty of judges, particularly where religious affiliations and politics 
intersect, as well as where judges might use the prestige of their judicial office to 
garner funds for religious causes.97 Yet such limitations seem reasonable, and do not 
preclude or discourage judges from meaningful involvement within a religious 
community. The elective side, while still unwilling to locate an affirmative space for 
religion in the judicial decision-making process, is arguably more willing than the 
appointive system to acknowledge that religion does have some value beyond 
functioning as a potential source of bias, as evidenced by the sheer number of 
advisory opinions that permit religious activity by judges. However, as the following 
discussion of Freeman demonstrates, even the appointive side allows judges to serve 
within religious communities, and the standard used for disqualification under § 
455(a) evinces a reluctance to mandate disqualification based solely on evidence of 
that service. 
In Freeman, Arizona and Idaho state legislators brought action asserting the right 
of the state(s) to rescind ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and 
challenging the extension of the ratification period.98 Defendants, the National 
Organization of Women (NOW), moved to disqualify U.S. District Judge Marion 
Callister under § 455, contending that his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned because he formerly held the position of Regional Representative in the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“Church”), which publicly opposed the 
ERA.99 The court held, inter alia, that a judge’s background associations, including 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. Id. at 190 n.63 (citing Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2007-4 (2007), 
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=449053) [https://perma 
.cc/2TJS-A6B3].  
 97. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“A judge shall not 
abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge 
or others . . . .”). See, e.g., Ark. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 94-03 (1994), 
www.arkansas.gov/jeac/opinions/94_03.html (finding that while mere attendance at a 
church’s annual scholarship fundraising dinner is permissible for a judge, being the guest of 
honor or a speaker is not); N.Y. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 03-75 (2003), 
www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/03-75.htm [https://perma.cc/6ABS-CCEV] 
(finding that a full-time judge should decline to serve on advisory panel of a religious order 
that reviews and considers procedures for handling allegations of sexual misconduct by 
members of the order).  
 98. Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981). 
 99. Id. at 729. NOW’s motion to disqualify additionally asserted that the court’s 
“appearance of impartiality might reasonably be questioned because”:  
(1) the Church or its members had been politically active in various parts of the 
United States in opposing the ERA’s ratification; (2) “[i]n certain states, . . . anti-
ERA lobbying efforts were organized and supported by Church Regional 
Representatives who were purportedly asked by the Church to undertake these 
tasks”; (3) “Judge Marion J. Callister [wa]s a member of the Church and at the 
time of the filing of this case was serving as a Regional Representative”; (4) “[a]s 
a Regional Representative, it was Judge Callister’s duty to assist the general 
leadership of the Church in the operation of Church programs in the region to 
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his religious affiliations, should not be grounds for disqualification, and that a trial 
judge’s former position as a Regional Representative in the Church did not require 
disqualification, despite the fact that Church leaders may have stated their opposition 
to the ERA, and opposed the extension of the ratification deadline.100  
As the basis for its holding, the court noted that the Church was neither “directly 
nor indirectly involved in the pending litigation as a party or as an amicus curiae, nor 
had [it] ever attempted to promote its position on the ERA [through] litigation.”101 
NOW argued that under the ABA’s Model Code, a judge should refrain from serving 
as an officer in any organization whose interest might come before the court—for 
example, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nia Brith, the Sierra Club, and the 
NAACP.102 The court, however, countered that the Church, unlike the cited advocacy 
groups, were not single-issue organizations that primarily make use of the judicial 
system to advance their advocacy goals.103 Judge Callister’s point that churches, 
while certainly operating as important loci for ideological exploration, are not at their 
core advocacy-centric enterprises, is buried in a footnote in his opinion.104 And while 
Freeman has been the subject of intense discussion for nearly four decades, this point 
rarely makes the metaphorical airwaves. Judge Callister’s holding captures an 
important distinction between churches advocating for a particular outcome and 
advocacy groups themselves: churches do not use the courts as the primary vehicle 
of furthering their social or political agendas—churches use community 
organization, public outreach, and faith-based education. Conversely, advocacy 
groups, such as the NAACP, since their inception, have pursued their stated policy 
objectives (i.e., attacking segregation and racial inequality) through the courts. 
Next, the court observed that because NOW conceded that a motion to disqualify 
based solely upon membership in the Church would be improper,105 the focal point 
of the court’s inquiry should be “whether there is anything particular about the 
holding of the position of a Regional Representative in the Church that would require 
disqualification” under § 455(a).106 A judge should disqualify herself under § 455(a) 
“[o]nly when a disinterested observer, knowing all the facts, would determine that a 
judge’s appearance of impartiality could reasonably be questioned.”107 A Regional 
Representative, the court noted, is one of “limited jurisdiction and circumscribed 
responsibility,” and organizing political lobbying efforts is not part of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
which he was assigned” (including his duties carrying forth the Church’s 
opposition to the ERA); (5) “[t]he Church considers its position on the ERA to 
be of the utmost importance and those who back the ERA are subject to sanctions, 
including excommunication, as is evidenced by proceedings taken against 
the leader of the group ‘Mormons for ERA.’” 
Id. at 729–30.  
 100. Id. at 729, 733.  
 101. Id. at 731.  
 102. Id. at 731 n.33.  
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. at 731.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 733. 
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responsibilities of the Regional Representative.108 If such an act were undertaken, it 
would be in the representative’s personal, rather than Church, capacity.109  
If NOW had succeeded in its disqualification motion, judges would have 
effectively lost the right to participate in religious communities. Judge Callister’s 
erstwhile role as Regional Representative certainly suggested that he might have 
personal beliefs that did not align with those of NOW, but that role did not preclude 
him from providing the parties with an impartial forum in which to try their case. 
After all, the standard for determining whether a judge’s impartiality cannot be 
questioned is not applied from the point of view of the parties, but from the 
perspective of a disinterested observer.110 That judge and litigant do not share similar 
religious values is not a sign of judicial bias or lack of impartiality; if such ideological 
divergence were a sign of bias or partiality, then the robust protections associated 
with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment111 would not apply to judges. 
“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and 
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”112  
Yet the U.S. Supreme Court has long acknowledged a vital distinction between 
the “freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of 
things, the second cannot be.”113 Judges are protected by the “freedom to believe” 
and litigants are protected by the limitations placed on the judges’ “freedom to act.” 
Implicit in Cantwell’s statement that judges may not act based on their beliefs is the 
expectation that religious judges have the capacity to separate the outcome suggested 
by their religious convictions and the outcomes directed by the evidence and relevant 
law. This Comment argues that an impartial, value-sensitive judge can consult 
religious values—where religious values would be useful—alongside other secular 
values to arrive at the outcome directed by the evidence and relevant law. The way 
the judge interprets and applies relevant law to the evidence is certainly influenced 
by the judge’s upbringing, education, career history, and other formative 
experiences, including, perhaps, a judge’s religious faith. 
 In his opinion, Judge Callister devoted no space to explaining the role of the 
Church in his daily life. Yet it is clear, evidenced by his former position as a Regional 
Representative, that the Church did influence his sense of self. The late Judge 
Callister’s Mormon faith likely impacted his individual choices, personal and 
professional commitments, and ideological alignments. Fortunately, the laws 
surrounding disqualification procedure recognize the enduring value of the Mormon 
faith in his life—even during his tenure as a federal judge. Permitting judges to serve 
in (albeit somewhat restricted) roles in religious organizations, and then suggesting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. See Parrish v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 103, 103–04 (5th Cir. 
1975) (en banc) (articulating the test as one where a claim under subsection 455(a) is 
“supported by facts which would raise a reasonable inference of a lack of impartiality on the 
part of the judge in the context of the issues presented in a particular law suit”).  
 111. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
 112. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
 113. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).  
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that the values that underpin those organizations can offer no guidance whatsoever 
to the judge during the judicial decision-making process makes little sense. It is 
possible to be deeply devoted to one’s religion and deeply devoted to the rule of law; 
it is possible to occupy a position within a religious community and not allow that 
position to dictate an outcome or decision that improperly favors one party.  
III. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The final Part of this Comment proposes small but targeted amendments to both 
Rule 2.4 of the ABA’s Model Code, as well as Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct. 
Because the rules in both codes are themselves succinct and only infrequently subject 
to change, I suggest an addition to the existing Comment to Rule 2.4 of the Model 
Code, and I suggest the addition of two new commentaries to Canon 3 of the Conduct 
of Conduct, specifically for Canons 3(A)(1) and 3(C)(1). I do not suggest changes to 
Canon 2 of the Code of Conduct (although I discuss Canon 2(A) in Part II),114 because 
the objectives of Canon 3—that a judge should perform the duties of office fairly, 
impartially, and diligently115—are more aligned with the objectives of my proposed 
changes. Canon 2’s focus on the appearance of impropriety is relevant to the 
influence of extralegal values in the judicial decision-making process, but the Canon, 
per the Commentary to Canon 2(A), refers primarily to the “judge’s honesty, 
integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve.”116 Consequently, Canon 3, 
which addresses both adjudicative responsibilities (including faithfulness to the law) 
as well as disqualification,117 is a more appropriate site for proposed changes 
concerning the role of extralegal values in judicial decision-making. First, 
faithfulness to the law requires an understanding of when consultation with 
extralegal sources is permissible; second, improper use of extralegal sources can 
trigger disqualification.  
A. Proposed Amendments to Rule 2.4 of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct  
 Rule 2.4 and the Comment to Rule 2.4 state:  
Rule 2.4: External Influences on Judicial Conduct 
(A) A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism. 
(B) A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or 
other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial 
conduct or judgment. 
(C) A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the 
impression that any person or organization is in a position to influence 
the judge. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
 115. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
2014). 
 116. Id. at Canon 2(A) commentary.  
 117. Id. at Canon 3. 
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Comment on Rule 2.4 
[1] An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases 
according to the law and facts, without regard to whether particular 
laws or litigants are popular or unpopular with the public, the media, 
government officials, or the judge’s friends or family. Confidence in 
the judiciary is eroded if judicial decision making is perceived to be 
subject to inappropriate outside influences.118 
As it stands, the Comment to Rule 2.4 does not offer any guidance on the proper 
use of extralegal values in judicial decision-making. Since Rule 2.4 is the rule 
governing external influences, it should provide guidance on how to distinguish 
between permissible and impermissible uses of outside influence. I propose adding 
the following language to the Comment to Rule 2.4. For ease of understanding I have 
included the existing Comment in regular typeface and italicized the proposed 
changes.  
Proposed Comment to Rule 2.4  
[1] An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases 
according to the law and facts, without regard to whether particular 
laws or litigants are popular or unpopular with the public, the media, 
government officials, or the judge’s friends or family. Confidence in 
the judiciary is eroded if judicial decision making is perceived to be 
subject to inappropriate outside influences. In determining whether 
judicial decision making is subject to inappropriate outside 
influences, it is important to distinguish between appropriate 
consultation with permissible outside influences, and inappropriate 
use of outside influences as the basis for judicial decision making. 
Judges come from diverse educational, professional, and 
sociocultural backgrounds; Rule 2.4 recognizes that judges should 
not be expected to disavow their backgrounds once they enter the 
judiciary. 
The proposed language has dual purposes: first, to emphasize the difference 
between improperly supplanting the law with extralegal sources and properly 
consulting extralegal sources to better understand the law and achieve the ultimate 
goal of justice. Roy Moore embodies the former; Judge Lipez, the latter. Second, the 
proposed language explicitly acknowledges that judges not only come from diverse 
backgrounds, but those diverse backgrounds are likely to consciously and 
unconsciously guide their respective decision-making processes. The proposed 
Comment to Rule 2.4, particularly the last sentence, is a major departure from the 
stern yet elusive tone of the current Comment. But comments are supposed to provide 
insight into the rules, and the current Comment offers no gloss on “outside 
influences.” Such an explanatory abyss helps no one—not in the least judges or 
litigants.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.4, r. 2.4 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
2019] DEVOTION AND THE RULE OF LAW  747 
 
B. Proposed Amendments to Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct 
 for United States Judges 
1. Canon 3(A)(1) 
Canon 3(A), in relevant part, states:  
Canon 3: A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office Fairly, 
Impartially and Diligently 
The duties of judicial office take precedence over all other activities. 
In performing the duties prescribed by law, the judge should adhere 
to the following standards: 
(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional 
competence in, the law and should not be swayed by partisan interests, 
public clamor, or fear of criticism.119 
Canon 3 concerns the performance of adjudicative duties. To help judges perform 
adjudicative duties in a manner that sustains its objectives—fairness, impartiality, 
and diligence—Canon 3 must offer a more in-depth articulation of what it means to 
be faithful to the law than it does at present. As of now, there is no commentary to 
3(A)(1). Therefore, my initial proposal is to add commentary; next, within that new 
commentary, I propose an explanation of “faithful to . . . the law”: 
COMMENTARY 
Canon 3(A)(1). Faithfulness to the law requires that the judge look to 
the relevant body of law as the primary source of guidance in judicial 
decision-making. Yet faithfulness to the law does not preclude 
consultation with permissible extralegal sources, so long as the 
permissible extralegal sources do not supplant the relevant source of 
law as the basis for judicial decision-making.  
Canon 3(A)(1)’s commentary should reflect this distinction between “consulting” 
and “supplanting” to reiterate the notion that judges are value-sensitive individuals. 
As stated in the introductory portion of this Comment, while there is no need for 
radical transparency from judges,120 there is a need for acceptance and normalization 
of the fact that judges can and do benefit, particularly at the margins of judicial 
philosophy, from drawing upon extralegal values in their decision-making processes. 
For those who might counter that this proposed Commentary to Canon 3(A)(1) offers 
implicit refuge for the Roy Moores of the federal judiciary, such anxieties are 
unlikely to materialize. If anything, the saga of Roy Moore is proof that those who 
demonstrate disdain for the rule of the law will not survive long in judicial office.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 119. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
2014). 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 22.  
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2. Canon 3(C)(1) 
Canon 3(C), in relevant part, states: 
(C) Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in 
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, 
including but not limited to instances in which . . . .121 
As of now, there is no commentary associated with Canon 3(C)(1). Because 
improper use of extralegal values, including religious values, implicates a judge’s 
appearance of impartiality, Canon 3(C)(1) would benefit from an explanation of the 
precise standard used to determine whether a judge’s impartiality has been 
compromised. Importing the “disinterested person” standard122 for disqualification 
under § 455(a), as applied in Idaho v. Freeman, would provide judges, litigants, and 
the public with a crucial reminder that impartiality in a judge is never determined 
relative to the litigant, but relative to a well-informed, disinterested observer. The 
proposed Commentary is as follows: 
COMMENTARY 
Canon 3(C)(1). A judge should disqualify herself or himself only 
when a disinterested observer, knowing all the facts, would determine 
that a judge’s appearance of partiality could reasonably be questioned. 
A party appearing before a judge can find any number of reasons that he or she 
might feel compromises the judge’s impartiality: race or ethnicity, educational and 
professional background, geographic ties, and the list goes on. Yet Freeman’s 
standard recognizes that parties appearing before a judge are always operating from 
an inherently “interested” position. To allow parties’ interests to dictate the standard 
for self-disqualification would go against the very principles of natural justice; no 
man should be a judge in his own cause.123 The famous words of Sir Edward Coke 
in Dr. Bonham’s Case reverberate in Freeman, in § 455(a), and must do so in Canon 
3(C)(1) as well.  
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps it is no coincidence that this Comment ends with a brief discussion of 
disqualification. After all, the goal of this Comment is not to argue in favor of relaxed 
disqualification standards, but rather to make sense of what judicial impartiality 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
2014). 
 122. Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 733 (D. Idaho 1981).  
 123. In Dr. Bonham’s Case, when considering the claim of the College of Physicians to 
fine its members for malpractice, the Chief Justice, Sir Edward Coke, declared that the censors 
of the College “cannot be judges, ministers, and parties . . . quia aliquis non debet esse Judex 
in propria causa . . . and one cannot be a judge and attorney for any of the parties.” 8 Co. Rep. 
114, 118a (C.P. 1610).  
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actually looks like in practice. To engage in a productive conversation about judicial 
impartiality, there must be room for discussion of the fundamental extralegal values 
that can underpin thoughtful judicial decision-making. Among these values that 
strongly shape a judge’s decision-making process, invariably, lies religion. Instead 
of shunning conversations surrounding the role of religion in judicial decision-
making, or clumsily conflating the presence of religious values in judicial decision-
making with a lack of capacity or desire to separate church and state, scholarship 
concerning judicial decision-making must theorize in support of the value-sensitive 
judge.  
